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WHAT HAPPENS TO PERJURERS
By H. L. MCCLINTOCK*
T HE opinion that perjury is common in our trial courts is one
on which all of the writers on the question seem to be in com-
plete agreement.' Though the extent to which witnesses in our
judicial proceedings wilfully testify falsely as to material matters
is a question as to which the facts can never be ascertained so as
to be made the basis of statistical investigation, we may accept the
opinion of those who have examined the question as to the serious-
ness of the problem, especially when it is confirmed by everyday
conversations of judges and trial lawyers. The suggestion that
"hundreds of persons perjure themselves in the courts every day
except Sunday"2 may be exaggeration, but there seems to be no
reason to doubt that perjury is common enough to constitute a
major problem in the administration of the law. The task of
wisely adapting the law to the complicated fact situations that
confront our courts so as to achieve a proper balancing of con-
flicting interests is difficult enough to engage the best thought of
the legal profession. If in addition we have the impossibility of
determining what the facts are, because we cannot rely on the
testimony of the witnesses who present those facts to the courts,
the task of proper administration of justice becomes an impossible
one. Ever since the statute of 5 Elizabeth, ch. 9, perjury has been
a crime punishable by the common law courts, as well as a religious
offense which subjected the offender to spiritual punishment, but
these penalties admittedly have failed to accomplish the purpose
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
'Hirschman, You Do Solemnly Swear, (1934) 24 J. Crim. L. 901;
Purrington, The Frequency of Perjury, (1908) 8 Col. L. Rev. 67; Scott,
Nothing But the Truth, (1936) 7 Mass. L. Soc. J. 12; Note, Problem of
Successful Perjury, (1934) 78 Sol. J. 423.2Note, Problem of Successful Perjury, (1934) 78 Sol. J. 423.
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of imposing any substantial check upon the practice of bearing
false witness.
While there is an agreement that perjury is rampant, and
that, as a general rule what happens to perjurers is nothing, there
is very little exact information available as to what has happened
to those few who were so unfortunate for one reason or another
as to be faced with a felony charge for doing what seemingly was
regarded as the usual thing. This study will attempt to examine
the information that is available in an endeavor to determine
whether any light can thereby be thrown on the reason for the
prevalence of this offense.
For reasons that are obvious, no information as to the number
of perjuries that are being committed can be obtained from an
examination of the police records of the country. Perjury is not
the sort of crime that would be reported to the police, and even
if such a report were made, there would be no assurance that there
had been an actual commission of the offense. In most cases, a
report of a homicide or a larceny indicates that such a crime has
been committed by someone, but a report of a perjury would not
give the same assurance that there had been some wilful false
swearing. If the records of the investigations made by the offices
of the 15rosecuting attorneys were accessible, we might get some
clue as to the number of perjuries obvious enough, or important
enough, to call for such investigation, as to which sufficient
evidence to justify a prosecution could not be obtained. When
such information has been obtained, as in the report 3 that the
district attorney of New York County, between 1900 and 1906,
"disposed of" one hundred and seventy-three cases of perjury,
fifty by plea or verdict of guilty, four by acquittal, thirty-eight
by dismissal by the grand jury, and eighty-one by discharge, we
get some statistical confirmation of the general opinion that only a
very small percentage of the cases of perjury are ever investigated.
Further confirmation of this opinion is furnished by the fact that
none of the crime surveys in the various states which have been
examined have published any statistics with reference to perjury;
if it figures at all in the studies it is only as one of several "other
offenses." 4
With respect to the perjury prosecutions that actually reach the
trial courts, the information is a little more extensive. It is true
sPurrington, The Frequency of Perjury, (1908) 8 Col. L. Rev. 67, 78.4Perjury appears as a topic in the index to the Missouri Crime Survey
(1926) 585 but the only reference under it is to a form of indictment.
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that the classifications of crimes adopted by the United States
Census Bureau in 1926, by the Committee on Uniform Crime
Records in 1929, and by the Johns Hopkins Institute of Law in
1932, provided no separate class for perjury, but grouped it with
"all other offenses." However, Professor Warner, in his study
of these classifications,' suggested that perjury, because of its im-
portance, not because of the number of cases, should be given a
separate classification, and that practice was adopted in the Census
Bureau Reports for 1937.7 In that report we find figures sub-
mitted by twenty-six states s and the District of Columbia which
show the number of perjury cases pending in the trial courts of
those states with the disposition made of them.
From these statistics, we see that there were 50,729 cases of
major offenses reported in those states, of which 187 or .37 per
cent were prosecutions for perjury. In the cases involving all
major offenses, there were pleas of guilty in 66.6 per cent of the
cases; convictions by the court or jury in 11.3 per cent; acquittals
by the court or jury in 5.2 per cent; and dispositions not involving
a determination on the merits in 16.8 per cent. In the perjury
cases, there were pleas of guilty in 45 per cent of the cases, con-
victions by the court or jury in 10.7 per cent of the cases, acquittals
in 5.9 per cent and dispositions not involving determination on the
merits in 38.5 per cent.
The differences in the percentages of convictions and acquittals
is not great enough to have any special significance, especially in
view of the small number of perjury cases involved, but the differ-
ences in the percentages of pleas of guilty and of dismissals with-
out a trial are striking. The explanation for the small percentage
of pleas of guilty, compared with those in other prosecutions, is
probably to be found in the nature of the crime, which indicates
that it would probably rarely be committed by those whose cir-
cumstances did not permit them to employ defense counsel, or
have such counsel furnished to them.9 The fact that there are
5Warner, Crime and Criminal Statistics in Boston (1934) 99.
GWarner, Crime and Criminal Statistics in Boston (1934) 95.
7U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Judicial Criminal
Statistics for 1937.8These states are: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont Washington, Wis-
consin, Wyoming. Two others, New York and Pennsylvania, also made
reports, but they included perjury in the general catch-all of other offenses,
so their reports are not included in this study.
O1t is probable that at least some part of this difference in the proportion
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
dismissals without trial on the merits in more than twice as many
cases, relative to the number filed, in cases of perjury, as in cases
involving other offenses, may indicate an opinion by the
prosecuting attorneys that there is more difficulty in obtaining
convictions on charges of perjury than on other charges, though
it also might be due to the fact that more pressure is exerted on
behalf of perjurers than on behalf of ordinary criminals to induce
the prosecuting attorney to dismiss the case. Some further indica-
tion of the fact that persons accused of perjury are more apt to be
represented by counsel eager to prevent their conviction by any
available means than are the ordinary defendants charged with a
major crime may be found in the fact that, while the latter waived
a trial by jury in 38.7 per cent of the cases which were tried, those
charged with perjury waived a jury trial in only three of the 31
cases of perjury that were tried, or 9.7 per cent.10
But there is very little basis for the formation of any conclu-
sions from reports which give mere quantities of cases in different
categories, with no chance for an examination of the cases to
determine what factors have controlled the results. When we turn
to the cases in the appellate courts, we are limited to a much
smaller number for any given period, and are considering a selected
group, but we do have the advantage of a fairly complete statement
of the facts in each case from which we may draw some conclu-
sions as to the factors that lead to the results in the particular case.
A study of all of the cases on the question would be mani-
festly impossible, so attention was confined to the more recent
ones. Every case which was cited under the topic of "Perjury"
of pleas of guilty to perjury charges from that found in other serious felony
cases is due to the fact that many guilty pleas in several classes of the
other felonies are entered because of a bargain between the defendant and the
prosecuting attorney, whereby the latter consents to accept a plea of guilty
to a lesser offense rather than assume the burden and risk of prosecuting
for the highest offense. See Beattie, A System of Judicial Statistics for
California (1936), ch. 12, pp. 139 ff., Pleas of Guilty and the Lesser Offense
Problem. In most jurisdictions, a charge of perjury would offer no oppor-
tunity for a bargain of this kind.
IoThere is some indication that trial judges are more apt to convict in
cases tried before them than are juries, in the fact that in 75 per cent of the
major felony cases in which a trial was had to the court after jury had
been waived, the judge found the defendant guilty, whereas the juries
rendered a verdict of guilty in only 65 per cent of the cases tried before
them. It would be more consistent with the general attitude of attorneys
who represent defendants charged with crime to assume that the jury would
be waived more frequently in cases where the defendant thought he had a
good defense on the facts, than in those cases where his only hope lay in
covering up or distorting the facts, which would lead us to expect a greater
percentage of convictions in the jury cases.
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in the Fourth Decennial Digest, and in the annual continuations
down to December 31, 1939,11 has been read. Disregarding the
cases where the citation was to a dictum in a case not involving
perjury prosecution, there were a total of 313 cases, coming from
all but two12 of the federal circuits, and all but seven 13 of the states.
Since the digests examined cover a period of fourteen years, this
means that an average of slightly more than 22 cases involving
perjury prosecutions were decided by our appellate courts each
year, certainly a very small number compared with the multitude
of cases dealing with other major felonies.14  These include not
only prosecutions for perjury proper, but also those for suborna-
tion of perjury, the statutory offense of false swearing in many
jurisdictions, and the offense of bribery or inducement of a witness,
which is in effect attempt to suborn if the purpose is to induce
false testimony, and is an offense of the same nature when the
purpose is to induce the witness to absent himself or otherwise
evade his duty to testify.
Of these 313 cases, only 85 came from the jurisdictions1 which
reported to the Bureau of Census the number of perjury prosecu-
tions for the year 1937. The caution"" with which the figures there
reported are to be regarded as typical of the country as a whole is
indicated by the fact that of the seven states17 which had an aver-
age of one perjury appeal a year or more, only California appears
in the list of those reporting perjury prosecutions, while of those
which had no perjury appeals in the fourteen year period, all but
two are among those reporting.
Of these cases, 258 were appeals, or other forms of application
"Probably there are other appeals in perjury cases, in which no point
peculiar to perjury was decided and which there was no practicable means
of locating.
l2The first and seventh circuits.
'3Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode
Island, Tennessee.
14There are no figures available for the entire country. See Orfield,
Criminal Appeals in America (1939) 211-214.
25Supra, note 8.
'
0Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America (1939) 184.
'7These states, in the order of the number of perjury cases reported are:
Kentucky, 35; Texas, 27; California, 22; Florida, 19; New York, 18;
Georgia, 17, Oklahoma, 16. Five of these seven are states in the southern
and southwestern part of the country where the percentage of criminal
cases appealed is very much higher than in other parts of the country. Note,
Criminal Appeals in Southern States, (1923) 21 Mich. L. Rev. 584. The
presence of California and New York in the list may be due only to the
fact that they are large and populous states having intermediate courts of
appeal whose opinions are published and digested in the National Reporter
System.
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for review, by defendants who had been convicted in the trial
court, 28 were applications by the prosecution for review of a
discharge of the defendant by the trial court, and the rest involved
other forms of raising the question in the higher court, such as
habeas corpus, or opinions by the trial courts on questions raised
before them.
Of the 258 cases of review of a conviction at the behest of the
defendant, there were 142 affirmances, 55 per cent, and 116 re-
versals, 45 per cent. No collected data as to the percentage of
reversals in major felony cases over a similar period have been
found, and the small number of perjury cases, together with the
numerous factors that enter into the significant study of statistics
as to appeals and reversals, 18 has indicated that the undertaking of
such a study would not be worth while. About all that can be
concluded is that the percentage of reversals in cases appealed
from perjury convictions is not so manifestly in excess of those
in other felony cases as to explain the failure of bur prosecuting
agencies to undertake the prosecution of more perjury cases.
In making a study of the opinions of the cases reported, it
was decided not to attempt a classification of the grounds upon
which the reversals were based as was done for the Missouri
Crime Survey, 19 since it so frequently happens that several assign-
ments of error are passed upon in the same opinion, and the
ruling as to each would have an equal effect upon the prediction of
the possible success of future prosecutions, whether it was the sole
basis for the reversal, or not, and in the case of affirmance all of
the rulings would be of equal importance. For that reason, each
case has been examined for all rulings on points argued by counsel
so far as they appear in the opinions, and a comparison has been
made of the proportion of cases in which the lower court's ruling
has been sustained to those in which it has been reversed, with
respect to the several stages of the trial at which the rulings were
made. It is evident that many of these rulings would not be
affected by the fact that the charge was one of perjury, such as
ordinary rulings on the impanelling of the jury, the competency
of evidence, and misconduct of court or counsel. Other rulings
are clearly affected by the nature of the charge. These include
most rulings on the sufficiency of the indictment, the degree of
proof of the falsity of the testimony which is required, and the
materiality of the testimony. Do the cases show any significant
I8 Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America (1939) 184.19Missouri Crime Survey (1926) 223.
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differences in the treatment of these particular objections which
would tend to show a greater technicality in dealing with the
crime of perjury? There seems to be a general opinion that such
is the case; do the modern opinions support it?
At common law there could be no doubt that the indictment for
purjury was a maze of technicalities.2 Not only did it have to
allege all of the subsidiary facts essential to the proof of the crime,
such as the facts that the testimony was given in a described cause
then pending in a particular court; that the defendant was sworn
by a named officer of the court; the issues before the court, gen-
erally by incorporating the entire record of the pending cause in
the indictment; and the falsity of the testimony to the knowledge
of the accused; but the pleader also had to allege the conclusions
that the court had jurisdiction, the officer had the authority to
administer the oath, the testimony was material, and it was wil-
fully and corruptly given. In addition to alleging that the testi-
mony was false, the indictment generally had also to allege what
was the truth with respect to the testimony. 2' Since 1790, there
has been a federal statute 2 2 modifying these technical requirements,
and similar statutes have been adopted in many of the states..22
The courts have, as a rule, given reasonable effect to these statutes,
and, even in matters not expressly covered by them, have shown
a commendable tendency to disregard mere technical objections
to the indictment.
There are a few decisions holding indictments invalid for
defects which it is difficult to conceive had any prejudicial effect
on the rights of the defendant. A court may still say that "an
indictment for perjury is one of the most difficult indictments to
draw, and the requirements are strict as to the essential parts of
the indictment," in holding that an indictment which failed to
state the names of the parties to the fight, which defendant was
charged with falsely swearing did not take place, did not allege
the substance of the cause before the court when the denial was
made.2 4  Another court has held that an indictment is fatally
defective if it fails to allege that the clerk of the court, who was
20Wharton, Criminal Law (12th ed. 1932) secs. 1551-1570.
211t may be questioned whether this extreme technicality indicates ajudicial hostility to perjury prosecutions, or is the natural result of the
application of ordinary technical rules of pleading in indictments to what
is inherently a complex crime.22Now 18 U. S. C. sec. 558.
23American Law Inst., Code of Criminal Procedure, Tentative Draft
No. 1 (1928) Commentary to sec. 186, p. 486.
2 Chenault v. State, (1929) 154 Miss. 21, 33, 122 So. 98, 100.
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alleged to have administered the oath, had lawful authority to do
so, 25 which seems to require the pleading of a pure conclusion of
law. An indictment which covered three and one-half pages
was held to have failed to inform the defendant sufficiently of the
charge which the grand jury was investigating when he gave the
false testimony before it.26  But these decisions do not represent
the present trend of the opinions. The Mississippi case from
which the above quotation was taken was the only one of the six
cases decided by that court in the period under examination in
which the sufficiency of the indictment was questioned. Alabama
has held that an allegation that tile grand jury was investigating
violations of the liquor laws was sufficient.2 7  Variances between
the pleading and the proof as to the date of the homestead entry
in support of which the false affidavit was made,28 the name of the
defendant in the case in which the testimony was given,20 the
spelling of the name of the county in which the grand jury sat,30
and the designation of the court before which the testimony was
given as the "district court" whereas it was the "criminal district
court," 31 have been held not to be fatal.
Arkansas has even held that a variance as to the officer alleged
to have administered the oath is not fatal under the statute,
though it would have been at common law.3 2  The omission of
such officer's name has been held not to invalidate the indictment.33
In other cases, the omission of certain adjectives used in the
definition of the crime, such as "falsely, 21 4 "wilfully,"2 5 and
"knowingly"' 6 has been disregarded where the other allegations
sufficiently show the presence of these qualifications. The Louisi-
ana court paid slight heed to the objection that the indictment
alleged the false testimony related to a material "question" rather
25State v. Biedermann, (1938) 342 Mo. 957, 119 S. W. (2d) 270.2GPeople v. Lisandrelli, (1931) 139 Misc. Rep. 129, 249 N. Y. S. 55. The
Court, however, ruled that the missing information should be supplied by a
bill of particulars.27Wofford v. State, (1926) 21 Ala. App. 521, 109 So. 886, cert. den.
215 Ala. 106, 109 So. 887.28Dunlap v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 868,
cert. den. 273 U. S. 764, 47 Sup. Ct. 477, 71 L. Ed. 880.
29Fields v. State, (1927 94 Fla. 493, 114 So. 317.
8OLee v. State, (1933) 123 Tex. Cr. 32, 57 S. W. (2d) 123.81Castro v. State, (1933) 124 Tex. Cr. 13, 60 S. W. (2d) 211.
32Cluck v. State, (1936) 192 Ark. 1036, 96 S. W. (2d) 489.
23State v. Bolyn, (1928) 143 S. Car. 63, 141 S. E. 165.
34Maddox v. State, (1938) 213 Ind. 537, 12 N. E. (2d) 947; Kemp v.
State, (1933) 137 Kan. 290, 20 P. (2d) 499. In the latter case the indict-
ment did not expressly allege the testimony was false.35Gatewood v. Commonwealth, (1925) 215 Ky. 360, 285 S. W. 193.
seWheeler v. Commonwealth (1933) 248 Ky. 728, 59 S. W. (2d) 992.
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than "issue." 37 Texas has held that where the indictment charged
the defendant with false testimony before the grand jury while
the latter was investigating charges against him, it need not allege
that he was granted immunity before he testified. 38 That court
did hold that the variance between an allegation that an affidavit
was made without qualification and proof that it was made on
information and belief was fatal, but it recognized the general
policy against technical objections, by pointing out that when the
statement is made on information and belief, the indictment must
allege that defendant did not have such information or belief,
which was omitted from this indictment.3 9 The Idaho court held
that the substance of the controversy was not alleged as required
by statute where the indictment merely alleged the name of the
parties to the suit in which the testimony was given, with the court
and docket number.4 0  The court examined numerous authorities
on the question and chose to follow what it called the Washington
rule, rather than the contrary California rule, since the former
more nearly accorded with the usual meaning of the word "sub-
stance." Oklahoma holds that the jurisdiction of the court over
the particular case must be alleged, since the court does not take
judicial notice of that as it does of the general jurisdiction of the
court.
41
There has apparently not been much difficulty in alleging
properly the administration of the oath. It has been held that an
allegation that the oath was duly administered is sufficient to
show that the officer had authority to administer it.42  On the
other hand an allegation merely that defendant "swore" to certain
facts was held not enough to show the oath was administered to
him.
43
The statutes generally expressly relax the strict common law
requirements with regard to pleading the materiality of the testi-
mony, by providing that it shall be sufficient to set out the substance
of the charge, without alleging the pleadings and other parts of
the record of the case in which the testimony was given to show
what the issues were. In some jurisdictions, it is still necessary
37State v. Sweat, (1926) 159 La. 769, 106 So. 298.38Mataleski v. State, (1937) 132 Tex. Cr. 344, 104 S. W. (2d) 44.
39Powitzky v. State, (1938) 134 Tex. Cr. 606, 117 S. W. (2d) 72. The
state's attorney confessed error in this case.40 State v. Lowe, (Idaho 1939) 88 P. (2d) 502.
4"Thomas v. State, (1927) 36 Okla. Cr. 209, 253 Pac. 514.
42Lancaster v. State, (1936) 54 Ga. App. 411, 187 S. E. 903.
'3Sanlin v. Commonwealth (1926) 212 Ky. 394, 279 S. W. 648.
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to allege the issues and facts which show the testimony to have
been material, 44 since the allegation that it was material is a mere
conclusion.4 But the majority of the courts have held that ma-
teriality may be alleged either by alleging the issues and facts
from which it appears, or by alleging merely that it was material."
If the facts are alleged, they must establish the materiality of the
testimony. An indictment which failed to allege that the property
to which the testimony related was the same property as was in-
volved in the suit in which the testimony was given, was fatally
defective. 47 In Colorado, it was held in one case that the informa-
tion must allege what were the proceedings before the grand
jury when the defendant gave the testimony before it in order
that the materiality of the defendant's testimony might be deter-
mined, 48 but in a later case it was held that an allegation that the
testimony was material to the issues before the court -was sufficient,
the former case being distinguished on the ground that the grand
jury could not determine, as a court could, whether the testimony
was material. 48  Georgia has modified its case holding that the
facts must be alleged by holding that they need not be stated in
detail to show how the testimony was material,50 and need not
argue its materiality."
The requirement that the indictment set out what the truth of
the matter was, as well as alleging that the testimony was false, has
been generally discarded. Some courts have stated without qualifi-
cation that it need not be set out, 2 others have said that it need
not be when the statement that the testimony was false sufficiently
indicates what the truth must be."2 In none of the cases which
44Stewart v. State, (1931) 42 Ga. App. 469, 156 S. E. 643.
45People v. Lisandrelli, (1931) 139 M isc. Rep. 129, 249 N. Y. S. 55.
46Claiborne v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 682;
Carter v. State, (1930) 181 Ark. 665, 27 S. W. (2d) 781; People v. Low
Ying, (1937) 20 Cal. App. (2d) 39, 66 P. (2d) 211 (unless facts alleged show
it to have been immaterial) ; Dunn v. State, (1932) 203 Ind. 265, 180 N. E.
5, 80 A. L. R. 1437 (unless other allegations show it to have been im-
material); State v. Stegall, (1928) 318 Mo. 643, 300 S. W. 714 (by
statute) ; Thomas v. State, (1927) 36 Okl. Cr. 209, 253 Pac. 514; State v.
Reidt, (1929) 54 S. Dak. 178, 222 N. W. 677 (by statute) ; Davis v. State,
(1927) 107 Tex. Cr. 389, 296 S. W. 605.4 7People v. Planer, (1937) 23 Cal. App. (2d) 251, 72 P. (2d) 767.48Treece v. People, (1934) 96 Colo. 32, 40 P. (2d) 233.
49Papas v. People, (1936) 98 Colo. 3(06, 55 P (2d) 1330.
5oPope v. State, (1931) 43 Ga. App. 175, 158 S. E. 350.51Clackum v. State, (1936) 55 Ga. App. 44, 189 S. E. 397.
,
52Sharron v. United States (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1926) 11 F. (2d) 689, (by
statute) ; Pawley v. United States, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 1024.
53Otto v. United States (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1932) 54 F. (2d) 277; Carter
v. State, (1930) 181 Ark. 665, 27 S. W. (2d) 781 ; Saunders v. State, (1927)
122 Kan. 840, 253 Pac. 572; State v. Reidt, (1929) 54 S. Dak. 178, 222
N. W. 677 (where the testimony was in simple, direct form).
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qualified the rule did the court find that there was a necessity
in that case to state what the truth was. An indictment which
alleges two inconsistent statements of defendant under oath, but
does not allege which was false, is not good5 4  In Texas it has
been held error to allege that an entire affidavit was false when
parts of it were admittedly true.-
In New York, the indictment may be attacked because the
evidence before the grand jury was not sufficient to make a prima
facie case. Two perjury indictments attacked on this ground
were sustained, one by the trial court,-" and one by the appellate
division5 7 after it had been dismissed by the trial court 8
From this survey of the modern cases, it seems evident that
the technical requirements for an indictment for perjury are not
so strict as to form any basis for a reluctance on the part of
prosecuting attorneys to undertake a prosecution of that crime
if there is evidence that it has been committed. From the nature
of the crime, the indictment will necessarily be more complex
than that for most crimes, and from the infrequency of its use,
there will be required more study before the preparation of the
charge, but the degree of those difficulties is not so great as to
excuse the failure of an attempt to prosecute. The indictment or
information was attacked in 116 of the 313 cases studied. It was
sustained in 80 of these cases and held insufficient in 36. The
percentage of indictments sustained, 69 per cent compared with
the 55 per cent of affirmances, shows that the difficulty of drafting
a proper indictment is not a major problem in the successful
prosecution of a perjury or subornation 9 charge.
The indictment might be still further simplified by the adoption
of a short form, such as has been adopted in Arkansas.8 0 That
form would seem to be adequate to inform both court and de-
fendant of the particulars of the charge, in fact would answer
-4Hilliard v. United States (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 99. But
a statute authorizing such an indictment is valid. State v. Ellenstein, (1938)
121 N. J. L. 304, 2 Atl. (2d) 454.
55Ziegler v. State, (1932) 121 Tex. Cr. 91, 50 S. W. (2d) 317.5OPeople v. Miro, (1934) 151 Misc. Rep. 164, 271 N. Y. S. 341.
57People v. Nicosia, (1938) 255 App. Div. 813, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 345.
58People v. Nicosia, (1938) 166 Misc. Rep. 597, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 35.
50The indictment for subornation must allege the completed crime of
perjury by the person suborned, so that it is subject to the same rules as
govern the indictment for perjury. The additional allegations of subornation
seem to have caused little difficulty.
0OArkansas Dig. of Stats., (Pope 1937) sec. 3278. And see the Arkansas
form of perjury indictment set out with approval in Missouri Crime Survey
(1926) 552.
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that purpose to the defendant better than a technical common law
indictment which would leave the ordinary layman utterly confused
as to what it was all about. But the profession does not seem
to be ready for the great innovation of the short form. The statute
prescribed by the model code of criminal procedure,"' which simply
provides that no indictment or information for perjury or related
crimes shall be invalid because of the omission of allegations
therein listed, does not offer any improvement in substance over
the federal statute,6 2 and its negative form may lead to decisions
that it does not apply to indictments not expressly covered by it,
though they would be held to comply with the general affirmative
language of the federal act.
At common law perjury could be committed only by false
oath in connection with judicial proceedings. There was a separate
offense known as false swearing which covered certain other false
oaths.6 13 In this country, statutes have generally extended the
offense of perjury to include all false oaths required by law,
though in some jurisdictions there is a separate offense of false
swearing which may be at least partly concurrent with perjury,(4
but which omits some of the technical requirements of perjury.
Under all of these statutes, however, as well as at common law, it
must appear that the oath taken was one which was required, or at
least authorized by law.62 No jurisdiction has undertaken to
prosecute the making of a false affidavit which is purely voluntary.
The fact that the court lacked jurisdiction of the particular divorce
proceeding because the plaintiff in that suit had not resided in the
state for one year, as the accused falsely testified he had, does not
prevent the oath from being one in judicial proceedings on which
a charge of perjury can be based.66  Nor does the invalidity of the
municipal ordinance for the violation of which were brought the
judicial proceedings in which the false testimony was given
establish that the oath was not required by law.6 7 The California
6lAmerican Law Inst., Code of Crim. Proced. (1930), sec. 186.
6218 U. S. C. sec. 558.
63Wharton, Crim. Law (12th ed. 1932) sec. 1533.
64See, for example, Weiner v. Commonwealth, (1927) 221 Ky. 455, 298
S. W. 1075, expressly overruling an earlier case and holding that the
Kentucky crime of false swearing includes all perjury. In New York and
Washington the lesser offense is called perjury in the second degree. People
v. Reiss, (1938) 255 App. Div. 509, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 209; State v. Dodd,(1937) 193 Wash. 26, 74 P. (2d) 497.65Larson v. State, (1927) 171 Minn. 246, 213 N. W. 900 (oath not re-
quired nor authorized on examination of defendant after conviction).
6People v. Rogers, (1932) 348 Ill. 322, 180 N. E. 856, 82 A. L. R.
1124; Abrams v. State, (1930) 34 Ohio App. 13, 170 N. E. 188.
67Mandehr v. State, (1926) 168 Minn. 139, 209 N. W. 750.
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appellate court held in two cases"8 that an oath which was required
only by a municipal ordinance was not required by law so as to
be the basis for a perjury charge, but the second of these cases
was reversed by the supreme court.6 9 All three of these opinions
professed to follow the ruling of the United States Supreme Court
on the power of the Land Office to require an oath in proceedings
before it.
Kansas has held that an administrative board which
has been given power to govern proceedings before it
by rule may require an oath.70  But where there is no
statute requiring an oath in an administrative proceeding, and it
does not appear that any rule required it, a voluntary oath taken
before such a body cannot be the basis for a perjury charge.71
Florida apparently restricts prosecutions for perjury to cases where
the law required the defendant to take the oath, and has held that
perjury cannot be sustained against one who impersonated an
applicant for a marriage license for false swearing in the applica-
tion,7 2 nor can it be maintained against one who gave false testi-
mony before a grand jury, if he could not be compelled to testify
because the grand jury was then investigating a charge against
him.7 - New York has held, however, that the right to refuse to
testify before a grand jury investigating the defendant's own con-
duct may be waived, and if it is waived perjury may be based on
false testimony there given.7 4 Likewise it has been held that one
who volunteers testimony before the Securities Exchange Com-
mission may be prosecuted for such testimony if false. 75
A similar question arises under the provisions of the Codes of
Procedure for the verification of pleadings. Generally these permit
the plaintiff to verify his complaint if he chooses, and give greater -
effect to a verified, than to an unverified, complaint. There has
been no difference of opinion that the verification of the com-
plaint is authorized, if not required, and that such an oath can
sustain a perjury prosecution.7 6 Generally the answer must be
08People v. French, (1933) 134 Cal. App. 694, 26 P. (2d) 310; People
v. Ziady, (Cal. App. 1936) 59 P. (2d) 850.69People v. Ziady, (1937) 8 Cal. (2d) 149, 64 P. (2d) 425.
7
0State v. Whitlock, (1933) 138 Kan. 602, 27 P. (2d) 262.
71Ex parte Pack, (1931) 51 Okl. Cr. 277, 1 P. (2d) 817; Commonwealth
v. Stiles, (1930) 97 Pa. Super. 559.
72Milligan v. State, (1931) 103 Fla. 295, 137 So. 388.
73State ex rel. Hemmings v. Coleman, (1939) 137 Fla. 80, 187 So. 793.74People v. Reiss, (1938) 255 App. Div. 509, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 209.75Wooley v. United States, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1936) 97 F. (2d) 258.
76People v. Godines, (1936) 17 Cal. App. (2d) 721, 62 P. (2d) 787, and
comment, (1938) 11 So. Cal. L. Rev. 309.
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verified if the complaint was, and that oath is clearly required, but
California has held that where the defendant is not required to
verify his answer to a verified complaint because the latter accuses
defendant of a crime, the verification has no legal effect and
defendant cannot be punished for perjury even though his verifica-
tion was wilfully false.'7 While there is ample justification for the
state's refusal to concern itself with the falsity of an oath which has
no legal significance, there seems to be no good reason to hold that
when the defendant voluntarily takes an oath which is intended to
affect legal proceedings, he should not be held to the same respon-
sibility for testifying truthfully as when he could be compelled to
take the oath. If anything, the law ought to be more lenient with
a man who has to answer, and who answers falsely to protect him-
self or another, than with one whom it permits to remain silent,
but who volunteers the false testimony.
Not only is it required that the taking of the oath be required
or authorized by law, but it is also essential that it be administered
by one authorized to administer it. There is little difficulty with
this requirement when the oath was taken in court because of the
rule that the court may authorize any of its officers to administer
the oath,7 including an attorney in the case,79 and where the record
showed only that the oath was administered by Mr. B. it was
presumed that he was an attorney230 This rule was disregarded in
a South Carolina case which held that a deputy clerk of the court,
who was a de facto and not a de jure officer because his appoint-
ment was not renewed after the re-election of the clerk, could not
administer a valid oath, and that the judge could not delegate to
him the authority to administer it.81 - When the oath is not ad-
ministered in open court the authority of the officer must be
shown.$2 The Pennsylvania court held, after a careful examina-
tion of the authorities, that the foreman of the grand jury had no
authority at common law to administer the oath to witnesses
appearing before the grand jury, and that the statute gave him such
authority only in case the witness was one whose name had been
endorsed on the bill presented to the jury.83 In Florida a statute
77People v. Millsap, (1927) 85 Cal. App. 732, 260 Pac. 378.
78Wharton, Criminal Law (12th ed. 1932) sec. 1553.
79Smoak v. State, (1938) 58 Ga. App. 299, 198 S. E. 99.
80Taylor v. State, (1938) 59 Ga. App. 1, 200 S. E. 237.81State v. Brandon, (1938) 186 S. C. 448, 197 S. E. 113.
82But the failure to prove all the steps in impanelling the grand jury
and appointing the foreman is not fatal, since the presumotion of regularity
will prevail, Young v. Commonwealth, (1938) 275 Ky. 98, 120 S. W. (2d)
772.
83Commonwealth v. Hubbs, (1939) 137 Pa. Super. 229, 8 Atl. (2d) 611.
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authorizes the state's solicitor to administer the oath to witnesses
called before him for examination. On the original hearing of one
case, it was held that the court could take judicial notice that a
named individual was the state's solicitor and had authority to
administer the oath, but on rehearing, it was held his authority
extended only to witnesses summoned before him.84 He does not
have authority to swear a witness summoned to testify before the
grand jury,"9 but a defendant who was subpoenaed to testify before
him, and wyho did appear and testify falsely, cannot attack the
indictment on the ground of defects in the subpoena.8 6 An oath
taken before a notary public who had not qualified as such within
the time prescribed to give her commission validity is not binding.8 7
At common law no particular form of administering the oath
was prescribed; what was required was that the witness be sworn
by a form which he regarded as binding on his conscience,88 and
that rule seems to prevail still, even in Florida.89 Though a
witness who has conscientious scruples against taking an oath may
testify in probably all of our states on merely being "affirmed,"
none of the cases studied have dealt with a witness of that kind.
This merely confirms what one would expect to find, that a witness
who had scruples against taking an oath would have equally
strong ones against bearing false witness. When the oath is not
administered in court, more attention is paid to form, though
probably not many courts would go as far as the Georgia court
which held that an oath by a witness before a grand jury to testify
truly in the "case" then before the grand jury did not comply with
the requirement of the statute that he be sworn to testify truly in
"here state the case."9 Where an affidavit is sworn to before an
officer authorized to administer oaths, certain required formalities
must be observed or no prosecution for perjury can be sustained
thereon. An instrument which contained several blanks when de-
fendant signed and swore to it is not a valid affidavit after the
blanks are thereafter filled in.1 The failure of deponent to sign
the deposition 2 or of the notary to attach the official seal to an
84Campbell v. State, (1926) 92 Fla. 775, 109 So. 809.
8 State ex rel. Stewart v. Coleman, (1936) 122 Fla. 368, 165 So. 272.
s0State ex rel. King v. Coleman, (1938) 134 Fla. 802, 184 So. 334.
87Faubion v. State, (1926) 104 Tex. Cr. 78, 282 S. W. 597.
saWharton, Crim. Law (12th Ed. 1932) sec. 1517.
8DFields v. State, (1927) 94 Fla. 490, 114 So. 317.
110Aldridge v. State, (1929) 39 Ga. App. 484, 147 S. E. 414.
"'IRives v. State, (1927) 107 Tex. Cr. 370, 296 S. IV. 576.92State v. Ledford, (1938) 195 Wash. 581, 81 P. (2d) 830.
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affidavit9 3 invalidates the instrument. But the affidavit does not
have to be read to the affiant. 94  It has also been held that the
testimony of the notary public merely to the effect that the de-
fendant signed the affidavit is not sufficient to establish its
validity."5 On the other hand the Kansas court recognized the
problem created by the administration of the oath by uninformed
notaries in a case where the notary testified that, after the de-
fendant signed the affidavit, she asked him if he acknowledged
it as his free and voluntary act and deed, by holding that the jury
was authorized to believe the official certificate that defendant
swore to the affidavit rather than the inconsistent oral testimony
given some time later, and anyway the parties had both done what
they thought was necessary to make the oath binding and that was
all that was required.96
In prosecutions for perjury, the statements made by the de-
fendant in giving the testimony alleged to be false may be proved in
accordance with the usual rules of evidence by anyone who heard
the testimony,"l by the court reporter after refreshing recollection
from his notes,"8 or by the transcript of the testimony.9 9 It has
been held that the proof of the defendant's testimony should be
limited to those statements alleged to have been false,100 but often
other parts of the testimony are admissible for other purposes,
especially on the issue of materiality.1 0'
While perjury still can be based only on false statements which
are material to the issues involved in the suit, or to the purpose
for which the oath is otherwise required, or authorized, the courts
have tended to be very liberal in their application of the rule. In
the cases examined, the objection t-hat the alleged false testimony
was not material was raised sixty-three times and was sustained
only thirteen times. The 80 per cent of decisions overruling the
objection is significantly in excess of the 55 per cent of the cases
in which convictions were affirmed. One court has gone to the
extent of stating that generally any evidence that is relevant in the
9 3State v. Epstein, (1926) 138 Wash. 118, 244 Pac. 388.
94Williford v. State, (1937) 56 Ga. App. 40, 192 S. E. 93.
95Stewart v. State, (1932) 25 Ala. App. 155, 142 So. 590.
DoState v. Kemp, (1933) 137 Kan. 290, 20 P. (2d) 499.
97Riley v. State, (1934) 26 Ala. App. 203, 155 So. 882; Cluck v. State,
(1936) 192 Ark. 1036, 96 S. W. (2d) 489.9sPeople v. Reitz, (1928) 86 Cal. App. 791, 261 Pac. 526; Clackum v.
.State, (1936) 55 Ga. App. 44, 189 S. E. 397.
DoState v. Brissell, (1934) 106 Vt. 60, 170 AtI. 102.
10°Riley v. State, (1934) 26 Ala. App. 203, 155 So. 882.
lolSee post, notes 122, 124.
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trial is sufficiently material to be the basis of a perjury prosecu-
tion.1 -02 Other courts have held that, to be material, the testimony
does not need to relate to the main issue in the case.10 3 It is uni-
formly held that testimony which is relevant only because it
affects the credibility of a witness in the case has sufficient effect
upon the determination of that case to be material.1 0 4  The appli-
cation of these principles is illustrated by the following rulings
which held the testimony to be material: in a suit for annulment of
a marriage not based on impotency, the denial that plaintiff had
had intercourse with the defendant after the ceremony;105 in a
prosecution for larceny by trick of a load of potatoes, testimony
that defendant bad paid for loads formerly delivered, which tended
to strengthen his defense that the load in question was delivered
on credit;100 on hearing to modify a custody order, defendant's
denial of intercourse with the child's mother before the order was
entered ;"'7 denial of making to officers statements tending to im-
plicate the defendant in a criminal prosecution, though there was
no evidence that the statements made were true ;108 testimony as to
an alibi, though it did not cover the entire time necessary ;09 testi-
mony that another, since deceased, had participated in a robbery
with the accused then on trial for that offense;110 denial that de-
fendant, a constable, had testified before the grand jury that he
had not requested accused to aid him in making. an arrest, though
defendant contended such a request would not have excused the
carrying of the pistol by accused.""-
The following testimony was ruled to be immaterial: in a
prosecution for perjury committed in testifying in defense to a
former charge of subornation of perjury, testimony that defendant
1o2State v. True, (1937) 135 Me. 96, 189 At. 831.
103People v. Chand, (1926) 75 Cal. App. 459, 243 Pac. 38; Lawson v.
State, (1927) 36 Okl. Cr. 349, 254 Pac. 110.
104Luse v. United States (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1932) 64 F. (2d) 776, cert.
denied 290 U. S. 651, 54 Sup. Ct. 68, 78 L. Ed. 564; Slutzky v. United
States, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 504; Fletcher v. State, (1932) 40
Ariz. 388, 12 P. (2d) 284; People v. Low Ying, (1937) 20 Cal. App.
(2d) 39, 66 P. (2d) 211; Papas v. People, (1936) 98 Colo. 306, 55 P.
(2d) 1330; Brannen v. State, (1927) 94 Fla. 656, 114 So. 429; Oxford v.
State, (1929) 40 Ga. App. 511, 150 S. E. 466; Clackum v. State, (1936)
55 Ga. App. 44, 189 S. E. 397; Crabb v. State, (1932) 131 Me. 341, 163
Atl. 83; People v. Kresel, (1933) 147 Misc. Rep. 241, 264 N. Y. S. 464.
10'People v. Reitz, (1928) 86 Cal. App. 791, 261 Pac. 526.
'
00 People v. Albert, (1928) 91 Cal. App. 774, 267 Pac. 587.
107People v. Hickey, (1936) 16 Cal. App. (2d) 726, 61 P. (2d) 532.
lMSTerry v. State, (1931) 50 Idaho 283, 295 Pac. 427.
1O3State v. Fail, (1926) 121 Kan. 855, 250 Pac. 311.
20Lawson v. State, (1927) 36 Okl. Cr. 349, 254 Pac. 110.
12'Polke v. State, (1938) 134 Tex. Cr. 496, 118 S. W. (2d) 793.
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was never in a certain court house, there being no evidence that the
subornation occurred in that building ;"12 in a suit for cancellation
of insurance policies, testimony that the premiums were not paid
by the state bank commissioner, where the evidence did not show
that the premiums were paid on the same policies as those it was
sought to cancel ;113 in a criminal prosecution, testimony that two
of the jurors had expressed an opinion on the case ;114 denial by a
witness that she -was in the room where the homicide occurred, the
court saying that she might have seen the homicide from outside of
the room and it was not shown what her testimony would have been
in that regard ;"12 testimony in a police court, where the charge
before the court was one which it did not have jurisdiction to
try ;11 false testimony as to the time a witness in a murder prose-
cution had returned to a city, when no issue before the court was
affected by his return at that time or later ;117 deposition in aid of a
petition for an injunction to restrain the enforcement of a judg-
ment rendered in a personal injury suit, to the effect that de-
ponent's testimony in that suit was false, where the injunction must
be denied regardless of the fraud because defendant had prosecuted
his appeal from it after learning of the fraud ;118 denial by a witness
for the state in a burglary prosecution that he had signed an
affidavit for the prosecuting attorney in which he substantially
confessed he was an accomplice oE the defendant on trial in the
commission of the burglary, since that affidavit was not admissible
in the burglary trial, and in fact was excluded from evidence in
that case." 9 In two cases it has been held that the grand jury has a
wide latitude in the investigation of charges under consideration
by it and the determination of materiality of the false testimony
has been governed thereby.' °2 0 Most of the cases in which the issue
of materiality has been discussed have been judicial proceedings,
but it has been held in one case that testimony before a Senate
li2Kuskulis v. United States, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1930) 37 F. (2d) 241.
1i3Stonebreaker v. People, (1931) 89 Colo. 550, 4 P. (2d) 915.114Bolen v. State, (1931) 103 Fla. 22, 137 So. 8.
1'5Rivers v. State, (1935) 121 Fla. 887, 164 So. 544.1 i6Smiddy v. Commonwealth, (1926) 214 Ky. 100, 282 S. W. 744.
"-,State v. Hall, (1930) 88 Mont. 2)7, 292 Pac. 734.
1'8King v. State, (1929) 112 Tex. Cr. 425, 16 S. W. (2d) 1072.
"
09State v. Lake, (1929) 107 W. Va. 124, 147 S. E. 473.
d 2oCarroll v. United States, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1927) 16 F. (2d) 951, cert.
denied 273 U. S. 763, 47 Sup. Ct. 477, 71 L. Ed. 880 (testimony no one was
in the bathtub from which defendant was charged with distributing liquor
to his guests in violation of the Prohibition Act); State v. Sang, (1935)
184 Wash. 444, 51 P. (2d) 414 (connection of defendant with gambling
resort under investigation).
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Committee investigating campaign expenses of candidates for the
Senate, which falsely denied contributions to the primary cam-
paign fund of a candidate, was material to the issues the com-
mittee had authority to investigate, though the Senate had no
power to regulate primary elections for that office. 2"
It seems probable that many of the decisions holding the
testimony to be immaterial could have been avoided by more
care in the introduction of evidence to show materiality. The safe
practice seems to be to offer in evidence all of the pleadings and
evidence in the case in which the testimony was given, and that
practice has been held not prejudicial to defendant when the evi-
dence is limited by the instructions to the issue of materiality. 22
When such practice has been followed, the court may properly
instruct the jury that the testimony was material as a matter of
law.12 3 It has been held, however, to be prejudicial error to admit
in evidence all of the record of the original cause, including the
names of the jurors and the rendition of a verdict inconsistent
with the testimony of the defendant, and thereby inform the
present jury that an earlier one had disbelieved the testimony. 24
Since the seventeenth century, it has been the rule in perjury
prosecutions that the falsity of the testimony could be established
only by the testimony of two witnesses, or of one witness with
strong corroboration from circumstances. 25  Though the rule
has been rejected in one recent case,' 26 and criticized in others,' 27
it is still the law in the great majority of the jurisdictions. In some
cases the rule has been further relaxed by permitting the falsity to
be proved by circumstantial evidence alone, ' 2  but another court
has limited that relaxation to cases where the nature of the testi-
mony is such that no direct evidence of its falsity could be ob-
tained,"' O such as testimony as to the -witness's knowledge or
12Sevmour v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 577.
22Hall v. State, (1939) 136 Fla. 644, 187 So. 392.2 3Foster v. State, (1929) 179 Ark. 1084, 20 S.'W. (2d) 118; Lee v.
State, (1933) 123 Tex. Cr. 32, 57 S. W. (2d) 123.
'
2 State v. Olson, (1932) 186 Minn. 45, 242 N. W. 348.
1254 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1915) sec. 2040.
12GState v. Manuel, (1925) 3 W. W. Harr. (Del.) 110, 131 Atl. 317, 42
A. L. R. 1058.
127Cohen v. United States, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1928) 27 F. (2d) 713; Goins
v. United States, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 147, cert. granted, 306
U. S. 622, 59 Sup. Ct. 461, 83 L. Ed. 1027.
l2sJacobs v. United States, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1929) 31 F. (2d) 568. cert.
denied 279 U. S. 869, 49 Sup. Ct. 483; State v. Wooley, (1937) 109 Vt.
53, 192 Atl. 1.
1"0Otto v. United States, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1932) 54 F. (2d) 277.
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belief ;1 0 the court refused to permit proof of the falsity of
defendant's denial that he had talked about engaging in a lottery
with his co-defendant to be established by proof that he and the
co-defendant had been jointly indicted in another jurisdiction
for the use of the mails in the, promotion of a lottery and had
pleaded guilty thereto, since there might have been a witness to
that conversation, even though as a matter of fact there was none.
In California, the statutory requirement of two witnesses is satis-
fied if the required number testify to circumstances which are
inconsistent with the truth of the testimony, direct testimony
as to its falsity not being required.13" ' In applying this rule it
was held that the testimony of all the motormen who operated
street cars on the route on the day when plaintiff in a personal
injury suit claimed he was strud by a car, that there was no
such accident to the car each witness drove, together counted as
the testimony of but one witness, but sufficient corroboration was
found in the absence of any report of an accident in the records
of the company, which were admissible as business records.132
In applying the two-witness rule, the courts of New Jersey have
held that the testimony of the corroborating witness, or the cir-
cumstances relied on, must relate to a material matter in order to
be sufficient. 33 The testimony of the several witnesses to the
falsity of the testimony must agree: so that a conviction for falsely
denying certain statements cannot stand where the witnesses
disagreed as to the statement defendant made.13 4 Texas has held
that the corroboration required must be furnished by credible
testimony and that accomplices are not credible witnesses. 35
New York has held the corroboration insufficient where the cir-
cumstances are as consistent with the truth as with the falsity
of the statement. 3 6 The courts have disagreed as to whether
lsOCircumstantial evidence was held sufficient to prove the falsity of
defendant's denial of recollection of the facts in BehrIe v. United States,
(1938) 69 App. D. C. 304, 100 F. (2d) 714.
'3'People v. McGee, (1930) 103 Cal. App. 149, 284 Pac. 229; People v.
Macken, (1939) 32 Cal. App. (2d) 31, 89 P. (2d) 173.
132People v. Layman, (1931) 117 Cal. App. 476, 4 P. (2d) 244. The
court quoted an earlier case to the effect that the corroboration may be
slight.
133State v. Lupton, (1926) 102 N. J. L. 530, 133 At. 861; State v.
Tabas, (1932) 10 N. J. Misc. 1212, 163 At. 29; State v. Ellison, (1935)
14 N. 3. L. 237, 176 Atl. 338.
'34Phair v. United States, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1932) 60 F. (2d) 953.
135Eldridge v. State, (1929) 111 Te:. Cr. 451, 14 S. W. (2d) 1036.
'
36People v. Quinn, (1930) 228 App. Div. 822, 240 N. Y. S. 231. With-
out questioning the legal rule of this case, its application may be doubted
where the defendant testified that the injured man received his injury
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the instructions must require the corroboration to be "strong"
or not.13 7  The rule applies only to proof of the falsity of the
testimony, 19 all of the other elements of the crime may be proved
by any evidence which satisfies the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.
A common application of the rule is made in refusing to per-
mit convictions where the only evidence of the falsity of the testi-
mony of defendaut consists of statements made by himself which
are inconsistent with the testimony. 139 The same result has been
reached in other cases by applying the rule that the corpus
delicti cannot be proved by the statements of the defendant alone.
140
Where the false testimony was the denial of the making of extra-
judicial statements, proof of the making of such statements is
sufficient to show defendant's guilt, since it establishes the falsity
of the testimony regardless of the truth of the extra-judicial
statement. 141 But where there is testimony of another witness
to the falsity of the testimony charged to be perjury, the state-
ments of defendant inconsistent with his testimony may furnish
sufficient corroboration to sustain the conviction.' 4 ' Even the
failure of the defendant, who took the stand in her own defense,
to deny the falsity of the statements in her affidavit, she claiming
they resulted from a mistake, has been held to be sufficient cor-
roboration.' 43
As Dean Wigmore has pointed out, 44 the only logical reason
for the adoption of the two-witness rule from the ecclesiastical
when his hand holding a knife was pushed by defendant against his body,
the injured man testified the defendant struck him with the knife, and the
testimony held to be neutral was that of a doctor to the effect that he found
the knife embedded in the injured man's skull.
37Brake v. Commonwealth, (1927) 218 Ky. 747, 292 S. W. 305 re-
quired the use of the adjective. Contra, Territory v. Lee Chee, (1931) 31
Hawaii 587.
"SBrake v. Commonwealth, (1927) 218 Ky. 747, 292 S. W. 305;
Shepherd v. Commonwealth, (1931) 240 Ky. 261, 42 S. W. (2d) 311;
State v. Ruskin, (1928) 117 Ohio St. 426, 159 N. E. 568, 56 A. L. R. 403;
Contra, Wheeler v. Commonwealth, (1930) 235 Ky. 327, 31 S. W. (2d) 377.
"'Hammer v. United States, (1926) 271 U. S. 620, 46 Sup. Ct. 603,
70 L. Ed. 1118; McGuire v. State, (1926) 171 Ark. 238, 283 S. W. 980;
Commonwealth v. Haines, (1938) 130 Pa. Super. 196, 196 Atl. 621.
'4ORichardson v. State, (1933) 45 Ohio App. 46, 186 N. E. 510;
Blakemore v. State, (1938) 39 Okla. Cr. 355, 265 Pac. 152.
141State v. Studen, (1936) 54 Ohio App. 417, 7 N. E. (2d) 671.
14-Wofford v. State, (1926) 21 Ala. App. 521, 109 So. 886, cert.
denied, 215 Ala. 106, 109 So. 887; Commonwealth v. Bradley, (1933) 109
Pa. Super. 294, 167 Atl. 471; Musick v. State, (1927) 106 Tex. Cr. 207,
292 S. W. 223.
143People v. Todd, (1935) 9 Cal. App. (2d) 237, 49 P. (2d) 611.
1444 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1915) secs. 2040, 2041.
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courts by way of the Star Chamber which for a time handled
all of the important perjury cases, namely that there should be
no conviction where there is oath against oath, has lost its validity
since defendants have been allowed to testify in their own behalf;
so that today in all other criminal prosecutions, except for
treason, the law permits a conviction where one oath stands
against another. The practical reason given for it, that it tends
to protect a -witness against the danger of trumped up charges
of perjury by disappointed litigants is not self-demonstrable, and
there has been no study of the facts brought forward to sustain
it. The extent to which the existence of this rule has operated
to deter prosecutions for perjury cannot be estimated from the
fact that the objection that the proof of the falsity of the testi-
mony was insufficient was sustained in only 25 of the cases in
which it was asserted, and overruled in 38 cases, because the
existence of any rule prescribing the minimum evidence necessary
to convict of any crime obviously operates to prevent the institu-
tion of the prosecution in all cases where the prosecutor knows
that he cannot obtain the required evidence. Of course, it is
ordinarily true that the testimony of one witness, standing alone,
that the testimony of another witness is false, ought not to
establish that fact beyond a reasonable doubt, neither ought it to
establish any other fact essential to convict the defendant of any
felony. But where the oath is one of a witness of unquestioned
probity in the community, who has no interest in the controversy,
weighed against the oath of a defendant who had very strong
motives for lying, there is no reason why it should not be ac-
cepted on the issue of the falsity of testimony alleged to be per-
jured, as it may be on all other issues in the perjury prosecu-
tion, and on all issues in prosecutions for other felonies. The
rule ought to be discarded, but, i[ it were, that would not alone
increase the proportion of prosecutions in perjury cases to
anything like the figures for other felonies.
Aside from the requirements of the two-witness rule, not
many questions have arisen with respect to the proof of the
falsity of the estimony. The judgment rendered in the case,
either civil or criminal, in which the testimony was given is not
conclusive as to its truth or falsity, or even presumptive proof
on that issue.1 45  Where the indictment charges the making of
more than one false statement, the falsity of all need not be
U4sPeople v. Fink, (1932) 118 Cal. App. 631, 5 P. (2d) 641.
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established to sustain a conviction.'1 4 It has been held that an
affidavit that defendant was too ill to register on registration day
is false where it appeared that he was not taken ill until the
afternoon of that day, though he still had time to register.J47 On
the other hand it has been held that the falsity was not proved if
the statement was technically true, as when defendant denied
knowledge that any of "his" tobacco had not been delivered,
and the proof showed that the tobacco referred to belonged to his
wife,1 48 and when the charge was a false denial of the purchase
of liquor on "the second Sunday in April," which the court judi-
cially knew was April 10, but the question asked him at the
liquor trial was whether he had purchased the liquor on April
11.1-19
Even where the testimony was clearly false, it has been held
that a retraction, or correction, of it on the next day, before any
witness had testified contrary to it, barred a prosecution for
perjury, since the law encourages the correction of erroneous
testimony.'0 0 But a correction made only after it became ap-
parent that the falsity was known is not a bar.151 In a case in
which the recantation was not made until after other witnesses
had testified to different facts, the United States Supreme Court
sustained the prosecution without qualifying what it found to be
the established rule that the offense was complete as soon as the
false testimony had been wilfully given.
1 52
To establish the crime of subornation of perjury, the prosecu-
tion must prove that the person suborned actually committed the
crime of perjury, which includes proof of every essential element
of the crime, and must also prove that the defendant induced the
commission of the offense. 53 The only suggestion in the cases
studied that the proof of the perjury in a prosecution for suborna-
tion differs at all from the proof necessary to convict the perjurer
himself, relates to the two-witness rule. It has been held that the
rule does not apply in a prosecution for subornation, at least
when the single witness to the falsity of the testimony is not the
14GShallas v. United States, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1930) 37 F. (2d) 692;
People v. Pahrman, (1931) 117 Cal. App. 433, 4 P. (2d) 242.
'
47jennings v. Commonwealth, (1928) 222 Ky. 95, 300 S. W. 353.
140Weiner v. Commonwealth, (1927) 221 Ky. 455, 298 S. W. 1075.
149Shelby v. State, (1936) 176 Miss. 753, 169 So. 844.
liOBrannen v. State, (1927) 94 Fla. 656, 114 So. 429.
'-'Sherman v. State, (1938) 135 Fla. 234, 184 So. 843.
1-United States v. Norris, (1937) 300 U. S. 564, 57 Sup. Ct. 535, 81
L. Ed. 808; Comments (1937) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 165; (1937) 23 Va. L.
Rev. 947.
25r32 Wharton, Crim. Law (12th ed.. 1932) sec. 1595.
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perjurer himself.154 In a leading case, the United States Supreme
Court had held that in a prosecution for subornation the falsity
of the testimony of the person suborned, cannot be established
by the testimony of that person alone."5" The lower federal court
ruled that the case did not hold that the two-witness rule applied
in all prosecutions for subornation, but the reasoning of the opinion
clearly leads to that result, the unqualified statement of the rule
being expressly approved. The rule does not apply to proof of
the inducement of the testimony by the defendant.150 On that
issue, it has been held that the person suborned is not an accom-
plice of the suborner, within the common law or statutory defini-
tion of that term as one who may himself be prosecuted for the
same offense, and, therefore, does not come within the rule that
a conviction may not be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice. 57
Some quantitative comparisons of the 313 cases studied may
be of interest, even if they are not conclusive, or even very per-
suasive, of the truth of any hypotheses that may be formed to
explain the infrequency of perjury prosecutions. The legal rules
generally mentioned to support the assertion that perjury is one of
the most technical of our crimes would manifest themselves
mostly in objections to the inlictment or information, to the
necessity and sufficiency of the oath, to the materiality of the
testimony, and to the sufficiency of the proof of falsity. Objec-
tions to the competency of evidence, to its sufficiency on issues
other than falsity, to the instructions of the court, and to mis-
conduct of the court or prosecutor would generally not involve any
rules peculiar to perjury. There were 284 objections which were
classified as belonging to the fi:-st group, of which 193, or 68
per cent were overruled, and 91, or 32 per cent sustained. In the
second group there were 247 objections raised, of which 166, or
67 per cent, were overruled and 81, or 33 per cent were sustained.
If these figures do not furnish any evidence that the courts
".4Cohen v. United States, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1928) 27 F. (2d) 713.
"SHammer v. United States, (1926) 271 U. S. 620, 46 Sup. Ct. 603, 70
L. Ed. 1118.
15GRuskin v. State, (1928) 117 Ohio St. 426, 159 N. E. 568, 56 A. L. R.
403.
157Layman v. People, (1931) 117 Cal. App. 476, 4 P. (2d) 244; People
v. De Vaughn, (1935) 2 Cal. App. (2d) 572, 39 P. (2d) 223; Conn v.
Commonwealth, (1930) 234 Ky. 153, 27 S. W. (2d) 702; Gleason v. State,
(1934) 86 Utah 26, 40 P. (2d) 222. Contra: People v. Nicosia (1938)
166 Misc. Rep. 597, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 35, reversed on a finding of sufficient
corroboration, (1938) 255 App. Div. 813, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 345; Mundy v.
Commonwealth, (1933) 161 Va. 1049, 171 S. E. 691.
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are not over-technical in their rules affecting perjury, at least they
furnish no confirmation for the hypothesis that they are more
technical in dealing with perjury than they are ordinarily. The
possibility that the rulings on non-perjury points may be affected
by the fact that the objection was raised on review of a conviction
for perjury cannot be tested without an analysis of the courts'
treatment of similar objections in prosecutions for other serious
felonies, which is not available. But it would seem that the only
two possible reasons for such an attitude on the part of the court
would be either a feeling that the act punished is not a reprehensible
one, or that it is punished too severely. Even if we discount the
frequent statements by the courts condemning perjury as a crime
which strikes at the foundations of the administration of justice,
as we must in view of their failure to take any more active steps
toward its suppression, we can hardly assume that the offense
meets with the tolerance of more than a small proportion of our
judges. The other reason is not sustainable when we remember
that at common law, when the technicalities surrounding this
crime were originated, and when they prevailed to a much greater
extent than they do today, perjury was only a misdemeanor.
Some facts with respect to the penalties imposed in the cases
studied also tend, so far as they have any value, to show that the
severity of the penalty does not affect the rulings of the court.
The sentences imposed are reported in only 87 of the cases studied.
The average of all sentences was two and a half years, the great
majority being for either one or two years. Seven of the re-
ported sentences were for terms exceeding five years,"' and all
'
5 8The longest sentence was 12 years, imposed in Dunkin v. State,(1932) 53 Oki. Cr. 115, 7 P. (2d) 1912, for testimony in a prosecution of
two other persons for a crime whose nature was not stated in the report.
Three others were for testimony in murder prosecutions, Slade v. State,(Miss. 1929) 119 So. 355; State v. McGee, (1937) 341 Mo. 451, 106 S. W.(2d) 480, 111 A. L. R. 821; State v. Kaempfer, (1938) 342 Mo. 1007, 119
S. W. (2d) 294. The two Missouri cases each involved testimony to
alibis for two other persons charged with a murder which caused such local
feeling that the conviction of. one was reversed for denial of change of
venue. State v. McGee, (1937) 341 Mo. 148, 106 S. W. (2d) 478. Another
long sentence was imposed in Blakemore v. State, (1928) 39 Oki. Cr. 355,
265 Pac. 152 for perjury in a trial for larceny of car tires, and in McCollum
v. State, (1931) 52 Oki. Cr. 28, 2 P. (2d) 291 where the original prosecu-
tion was for bank robbery. The only one of seven cases which did not
arise out of testimony in a prosecution for crime, was Weadock v. State,
(1931) 118 Tex. Cr. 537, 36 S. W. (2d) 757, where defendant, an under-
taker, had verified an account against the estate, including items for a
casket and a burial suit, when he had buried the body in a cheap box,
and unclothed. This was the only case of all those examined where the
court considered an objection that the sentence was excessive. It held an
eight year sentence not too severe, but it was regarded more as a punish-
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but two of these were affirmed. Those two cases both came from
Oklahoma, where the usual sentence imposed greatly exceeds the
average.5 9 The suggestion that the courts resort to technicalities
because they do not like to sustain perjury convictions, also fails
to explain why they resort to technicalities in order to affirm, as
they have done in holding that a person suborned is not an accom-
plice of the person who suborned him, 60 and as the Kentucky
court did in its ruling that one who had pleaded guilty to perjury
was a competent witness against the suborner, notwithstanding a
statute making one who had been convicted of perjury incom-
petent to testify in any case thereafter, for the reason that the
witness had not been convicted because no judgment had yet
been rendered on his plea.'' In both of these situations, the
reason for the rule would clearly lead to its application, but the
application was not made because the case was not within the
literal meaning of the statement of the rule.
Since there is no substantial evidence that courts are technical
in perjury cases simply because they are charges of perjury, nor
even that there is any great difference in the amount of technicality
in these cases, we must look elsewhere for the explanation of the
scarcity of perjury prosecutions. One of the reasons assigned for
it is that perjury is difficult to prove.16'6 We have seen that the
relaxation of tie requirements of materiality and quantum of
proof have left little difference between the legal requirements of
proof in perjury cases, and those applying to ordinary felony
charges. It would seem to be obvious that with the same ex-
penditure of intelligence and effort, evidence of the falsity of
testimony given in open court with full opportunity for cross-
examination could be obtained more easily than evidence of ordi-
nary crimes which are committed -n secret.
Much of the blame for the prevalence of perjury has been
placed on unethical trial attorneys who are willing to resort to its
ment for defrauding decedent's estate in that manner than as a punishment for
perjury.
159The average of the sentences reported in the Oklahoma cases is 5.9
years. This may be due to the statutory provisions requiring severe
penalties when the testimony is given on the trial of an indictment for a
felony. See Washburn v. State, (1930) 47 Okl. Cr. 321, 288 Pac. 371;
Roley v. State, (1930) 48 Okl. Cr. 60, 290 Pac. 195, both of which re-
versed convictions for an erroneous instruction to impose the lesser penalty
because the trial at which the testimony was given was on an information,
not an indictment, for felony.
'
6oSee cases cited supra, note 157 and accompanying text.
6'6 Bradley v. Commonwealth, (1932) 245 Ky. 101, 53 S. W. (2d) 215.
16-2Note, Problem of Successful Perjury, (1934) 78 Sol. J. 423.
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use to win their cases, and even sometimes maintain staffs of
witnesses who are ready to commit perjury in any cause.' 63 There
is some indication of the existence of such a situation in one
New York subornation case," 4 and there is no reason to deny
that it exists in other cases. But, admitting that to be the partial
explanation of the frequency of the crime, it contains no sugges-
tion as to why there are so few prosecutions, unless it is
charged that the prosecutors and courts are-willing to wink at such
a practice. There are some expressions by lawyers and judges
that indicate an opinion that in some'cases, such as testifying in
one's own defense in a prosecution for crime, 6" or a woman
denying unchastity when questioned about it,66 it is excusable to
give false testimony, but there is no proof that is a general pro-
fessional or judicial opinion, and if it were, the number of cases
where such an excuse is present is so small that it does not count
appreciably in the problem.
About the only explanation that remains is that in most cases
nobody has any particular interest in prosecuting perjury cases
and nobody is especially charged with the duty of investigating
and prosecuting them. Of the 188 cases where perjury was
charged to have been committed at the trial of some other criminal
charge, 36 of those other charges were vi6lations of the liquor
laws, almost one in five; and of 72 cases where the testimony was
given in a civil action, or proceeding, 15, or more than one in five,
were either negligence or bankruptcy cases. We have no means of
knowing how many of the prosecutions for perjury in liquor
trials were due to the insistence of law enforcement organizations;
nor how many of the negligence and bankruptcy witnesses- were
prosecuted because of the activity of insurance companies or
creditors' organizations which were interested not only in the
particular case, but in reducing perjuries in those classes of
cases.
Various remedies for the situation have been suggested. One
reason urged for the adoption of the English practice of exam-
'I-Scott, Nothing But the Truth, (1936) 7 Mass. L. Soc. J. 12.
lOSPeople v. Nicosia, (1938) 166 Misc. Rep. 597 , 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 35,
reversed, (1938) 255 App. Div. 813, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 345.
'
63"In the case of prisoners testifying in their own defense, it is at
least arguable that the law which permits of such testimony almost appears,
in injudicial language, to 'ask for it.'" Note, Problem of Successful Per-
jury, (1934) 78 Sol. J. 423. The writer has heard similar sentiments
expressed by a trial judge.
'I 0Perjury in Judicial Proceedings, (1930) 64 U. S. L. Rev. 1, quoting
a reported statement of a trial judge.
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ining witnesses before trial, and soon after the event concerning
which they testify is that it will make perjury rarer,0 7 but the
writer does not notice that the complaints in England concerning
the prevalence of perjury are as strong as they are here. °8
The adoption of a statute defining a lesser crime which will
be free from the technicalities of perjury is also advocated.'"
Several states have adopted such statutes and in Kentucky the
prosecutions are almost always brought under it.170 We might
conclude that here we have the explanation for the fact that there
were more appeals in perjury cases in Kentucky during the period
studied than in any other jurisdiction, except for the fact that
we find a writer stating that there had been in Kentucky only 81
perjury and false swearing cases in 130 yearsY.7  Some other
reason must underlie the fact that there have in the last fourteen
years been 34 of such cases, of which all but two were for false
swearing or subornation, which includes inducement to false
svearing, as well as inducement to perjury.12  In other jurisdic-
tions in which a similar statute has been adopted, it does not ap-
pear to have been used to any great extent.
Two writers have prophesied that within a short time science
would perfect a device by which it could be told infallibly whether
a witness is testifying to the truth and then there will be no per-
jury problem.1 7 3  If we accept the premise, we cannot deny the
167Aiexander, Uproot Perjury by Prompt Examination of Witnesses,
(1929) 7 The Panel, No. 1, p. 2. Compare Rowley, Perjury and False
Swearing as Contempt, (1933) 21 Cal. L. Rev. 582.
168Note, Problem of Successful Perjury, (1934) 78 Sol. J. 423.
'69Brazen Perjury Makes False Swearing Act Necessary, (1931) 9 The
Panel, No. 5, p. 53. New York now has such a statute, enacted in 1935,
which created the misdemeanor of perjury in the second degree. See Reiss
v. People, (1938) 255 App. Div. 509, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 209.
' 3700f the Kentucky cases examined, two were said to be prosecutions for
perjury, and twenty-seven were for false swearing.
3-Hirschman, "You Do Solemnly Swear"-or That Perjury Problem,
(1934) 24 J. Crim. L. 901.
17 2In a Kentucky prosecution for false swearing it is not required that
the testimony be material, but all of the other elements of perjury as de-
fined in other states seem to be required. The oath must be taken in con-
nection with judicial proceedings, or be otherwise authorized or required by
law. Commonwealth v. Strunk, (1935) 260 Ky. 35, 83 S. W. (2d) 861.
If it is given in judicial proceedings, the indictment must allege the matter
pending in the court. Sanlin v. Commonwealth, (1926) 212 Ky. 394, 279
S. W. 648. Contradictory statements of defendant are not alone sufficient
to convict, Commonwealth v. Sesco, (1939) 279 Ky. 791, 132 S. W. (2d) 314.
The two-witness rule applies, Pancake v. Commonwealth, (1931) 237 Ky.
1, 34 S. W. (2d) 735; and has been extended to apply to every essential
fact, Commonwealth v. Wheeler, (1930) 235 Ky. 327, 31 S. W. (2d) 377.
Contra, Shepherd v. Commonwealth, (1931) 240 Ky. 261, 42 S. W. (2d) 311.
'73Rice, Brazen Perjury Makes False Swearing Act Necessary, (1931)
9 The Panel, No. 5, p. 53; Hirschman, "You Do Solemnly Swear"-or
That Perjury Problem, (1934) 24 J. Crim. Law and Criminal 901.
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conclusion, but nine years have elapsed since the first of the
prophecies was uttered, and it has not yet been fulfilled, and the
scientists themselves seem to have less confidence now in the
perfection of such a device than they had nine years ago.1 7 4 The
law is hardly justified in refusing to do anything to solve the
problem because of the prospect that the problem will soon cease
to exist.
A few courts have undertaken to solve the problem by treating
perjury as contempt of court, 17  but the use of that device has
been severely restricted by the requirements that, to be contempt,
the answer of the witness must be false to the court's own knowl-
edge, and the falsity must be such as to be equivalent to a refusal
to answer, such as a denial of recollection of the facts which it
is apparent to the court the witness must remember.17  These
restrictions seem to be essential unless we intend to substitute
summary proceedings before a judge to determine guilt of a felony
for the constitutional requirements which govern prosecutions
for crime.
It looks very much as though the remedy is not to be found
in any reform measure that we can persuade the legislature to
adopt and which will then automatically work out the desired
result without too much trouble to anyone. If every judge felt
it to be as much his duty to report to the proper investigating
officers every instance of suspected perjury, as it would be to
report every death he saw which aroused suspicions of murder,
and if the enforcement officers would then devote the same
diligence in investigating those charges as they do in investigating
other charges of felony, it is highly probable that within a few
years there would have been so many convictions for perjury that
it would be extremely difficult to find many who were willing to
run the risk of incurring the penalty for the reward the offense
might offer. It may be that a statute expressly imposing such a
duty upon the judges and the enforcement officers would be of
some aid, but it could not alone be sufficient.1 7 7 What we must
174The successful use of such a device in the investigation of criminal
charges is not overlooked, but no progress seems to be made in perfecting a
device which can be used on witnesses during the progress of a trial for
the information of court or jury.
175Foster v. Hastings, (1934) 263 N. Y. 311, 189 N. E. 229.
1TGRowley, Perjury and False Swearing as Contempt, (1933) 21 Cal.
L. Rev. 582.
'
77New York has had such a statute for some time but very little use
has been made of it. Perjury in Judicial Proceedings, (1930) 64 U. S.
L. Rev. 1. Probably no such statute is required unless it is desired to
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work and wait for is the development of a professional and offi-
cial conviction of duty to stamp out perjury, which will not mani-
fest itself solely in verbal castigations of the offense in opinions
reversing convictions for it, but will hold lawyers, judges and
officers to a steady performance of a very disagreeable duty for
no other reward than the knowledge that they are playing their
part in the great work of administering justice between their
fellow men. Until that sense of duty is developed, it will doubt-
less continue to be true, regardless of other palliatives that may
be adopted, that, in the great majority of cases, nothing happens
to perjurers.
authorize the judge to make the commitment in open court, as seems to be
the opinion of the comments on the New York statute. It is hard to see
any benefit such a spectacular proceeding would have over the wiser and
safer practice of having the report made after the court adjourns. In United
States v. Freundlich, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 376 the opinion
stated that the prosecution was instigated by the court. In Mundy v.
Commonwealth, (1933) 161 Va. 1049, 171 S. E. 691, a prosecution for
subornation, it appeared that the trial judge had ordered the arrest of the
perjurer, who then confessed and implicated defendant. It is probable that
in many other cases the judge before whom the false testimony was given
has taken the initiative. See People v. Miller, (1933) 261 Mich. 598, 246
N. W. 678, holding it misconduct for the prosecuting attorney to state that
the prosecution had been instigated by the judge who was sitting as a
"one-man grand jury" and before whDm defendant gave his testimony, when
that fact did not appear in the record.
